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 A shortened, 5-item scale measuring belief in divine moral command is established 
 The scale shows good construct, convergent, and incremental validity 
 Divine Command beliefs best explain religious believers’ attitudes toward atheists 
 Also best explain believers’ propensity toward deontological/prohibitive morality 
 This scale should be important in ongoing research into religious/moral psychology 
  




Religion and morality have been deeply interwoven throughout human history.  Although much 
research has investigated the role of religiosity (e.g., belief in God, prayer, religious attendance) 
in shaping moral concerns, only recently has research in psychology begun to delve deeper into 
the meta-ethical beliefs theists hold about the spiritual foundations of morality.  The present 
research builds on moral-philosophical discourse on Divine Command Theory and recent work 
by Piazza and Landy (2013), who developed the 20-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority 
(MFDA) scale to measure Divine Command beliefs.  We sought primarily to reduce the MFDA 
scale to increase its pragmatic utility; Confirmatory Factor Analysis revealed an optimal 5-item 
scale.  Across four studies, this scale yielded levels of construct, convergent, and incremental 
validity equivalent to those of the 20-item scale.  Compared with several other measures of 
religiosity and conservative thinking, the short MFDA was the strongest predictor of anti-atheist 
prejudice among U.S. Christians and Indian Hindus (Studies 1a-1b) and largely explained 
religiosity’s relationship with attitudes toward science (Study 1a) and moral cognitive outcomes 
including deontological reasoning (Study 2a) and prohibitive morality (Study 2b).  We conclude 
with discussion about the practical utility of this scale in ongoing research into religion and 
moral cognition.   
 
Key words: Religiosity, morality, moral cognition, meta-ethical beliefs, Atheism, prejudice, 
Divine Command Theory, Morality Founded on Divine Authority.  
  
BELIEF IN DIVINE MORAL AUTHORITY 
4 
 
“I couldn’t go on living if I did not feel it with all my heart a moral structure with real meaning and forgiveness and some 
kind of higher power.  Otherwise there is no basis to know how to live.” 
 
From Woody Allen's Crimes and Misdemeanors 
 
Religion and morality have long been interlinked.  Indeed, religion may have facilitated 
the rise of modern civilizations by serving to unite individuals around a set of shared beliefs, 
practices, and moral principles (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010; Norenzayan et al., in press).  
Historically, religious institutions typically served as the chief sources of moral guidance and 
legal practice for millennia prior to the establishment of secular moral institutions such as 
government, police, and courts of law (Norenzayan, 2013).  
This strong cultural nexus between religion and morality persists in the current era, and 
may serve as a source of anxiety about cultural shifts toward secular governance (Gervais, 2013).  
Even today amidst increasingly secular and progressive cultural developments, a common tenet 
among religious believers across several diverse cultures is that one cannot be moral without 
believing in a supernatural, higher power (e.g., 53% of U.S., 70% of Indian, and a vast majority 
of African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Latin American pollees; Pew, 2014; also see Edgell, 
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Gervais, 2013).  For many religious believers, being a moral person 
depends on being religious.  Understandably, therefore, religion remains a potent guide to 
people’s deepest moral values and beliefs.   
Evidence shows that religiosity shapes morally relevant attitudes and behavior in a wide 
variety of ways (Norenzayan et al., in press; Shariff, Piazza, & Kramer, 2014).  For example, the 
stronger one identifies as religious, the more likely one expresses the values of maintaining in-
group loyalties, paying deference to authority, and adhering to puritanical notions of sexual 
purity and decency (Piazza & Landy, 2013).  Among Western samples, the more a person 
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identifies with their religion, the less willing they are to engage in utilitarian forms of moral 
reasoning and argumentation (Antonenko Young, Willer & Keltner, 2013; Piazza, 2012; Piazza 
& Sousa, 2013).  In addition, among samples of Israelis and Palestinians participation in 
organized religion increased support for terrorist activities (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 
2009).  However, with the exception of a few papers (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Piazza & 
Landy, 2013), very little research has considered how religion affects the way in which people 
think about the epistemic foundations of morality, that is, the “meta-ethics” of how moral truths 
originate and are established.  If the majority of people worldwide believe that it is necessary to 
believe in God in order to be moral (Pew, 2014), and look to their religion to provide guidance 
for living morally, then this implicates beliefs about God’s role in morality as a strong factor in 
shaping people’s moral thinking.  
Recently, Piazza and Landy (2013) explored this issue by establishing a 20-item measure 
of the belief that Morality is Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA).  They found MFDA to be a 
powerful psychometric tool for explaining the contribution religion makes to moral decision-
making.  In the present article, we primarily sought to establish and validate a shortened scale 
that would allow researchers to measure meta-ethical beliefs about divine moral origins in a 
pragmatic, time-conserving manner.  This added pragmatism will facilitate research investigating 
the role of meta-ethical beliefs in social-moral cognition, religiosity, and related topics, in several 
ways.  First, shorter scales are less taxing on participants, thus reducing concerns for participant 
fatigue, response quality, and dropout rates.  Second, researchers may be more likely to include a 
shortened scale in their surveys compared to longer forms.  This in turn allows room for 
additional measures in surveys, thus facilitating tests of the unique effects of meta-ethical beliefs.  
Finally, this added scope for including multiple measures of religiosity in surveys would also 
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make it easier to test precisely which aspects of religiosity (e.g., beliefs about the divine origins 
of morality versus religious attendance, prayer frequency, etc.) best explain the phenomena 
under investigation.   
Beyond this, we also sought to demonstrate novel effects of MFDA endorsement beyond 
those presented in Piazza and Landy (2013; discussed below) by investigating its role in an 
increasingly prominent topic in the social sciences: attitudes toward atheists (Studies 1a-1b).   
Additionally, we sought to investigate the role of beliefs in divine moral authority in determining 
a person’s orientation to: deontological, as opposed to utilitarian, modes of decision-making 
(Study 2a); and prohibitive morality (Study 2b).   
Divine Command Theory (DCT) and its Role in Morality 
Piazza and Landy (2013) developed the MFDA scale to investigate endorsement of 
Divine Command Theory (DCT), a theory traditionally confined to scholarship in moral 
philosophy (see e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009).  DCT is the belief that moral rules obtain their 
truth-value and normative force by virtue of being issued from God or a supreme being.  
According to one popular version of DCT, God’s will is perfect and his knowledge of what is 
best for humankind is also perfect (on account of God creating humankind); insofar as God wills 
and knows what is best, God has supreme moral authority in determining what is right and 
wrong. Furthermore, it is through God’s revelation (“scripture”) that God’s laws for living a 
moral life are conveyed.  Therefore, for devout believers, living a moral life requires knowledge 
of and adherence to God’s moral laws.   
DCT is not identical with a deontological approach to morality (indeed, the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant developed a secular deontological ethical theory based on rational principles).  
However, among contemporary Christian samples, a belief in divine moral authority appears to 
BELIEF IN DIVINE MORAL AUTHORITY 
7 
 
undergird a deontological approach to morality via commitments to follow divine ordinances, 
which generally take the form of moral rules (Piazza, 2012; Piazza & Landy, 2013; Piazza & 
Sousa, 2013).  Research by Piazza and colleagues has found that people who endorse DCT tend 
to think that moral rules should be followed even when breaking them would help promote a 
greater good.  They also tend to be fairly pessimistic about humankind’s ability to make good 
moral decisions, which may contribute to their reticence to abandon moral rules in the face of 
utilitarian alternatives.  
Importantly, DCT is also not identical with religiosity—not all religious individuals 
believe that morality is exclusively founded on divine authority.  Some believers have a less 
pessimistic view about human nature and view moral rules more as helpful guidelines than rigid 
standards.  Accordingly, even among religious believers there is considerable variability in the 
degree to which individuals hold beliefs about the divine origins of morality (Piazza & Landy, 
2013).  
Piazza and Landy (2013) operationalized Divine Command beliefs with a 20-item scale 
measuring the belief that Morality is Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA).  In a series of 
naturalistic moral dilemmas, MFDA was an important mediator between religiosity and non-
utilitarian moral decision-making (e.g., judging it wrong to lie even when lying produces greater 
welfare for all).  MFDA also mediated the relationship between religiosity and endorsement of 
moral concerns that are typically promoted more in religious than in secular moral systems (e.g., 
ingroup loyalty, deference to authority/tradition, and concerns for bodily/spiritual purity; Graham 
& Haidt, 2010).  
Hence, there is some evidence that Divine Command beliefs are important in 
understanding variability in moral values, judgments, and beliefs, and that the MFDA scale is a 
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valid operationalization of such beliefs.  The current MFDA scale, however, contains 20 items, 
which is highly impractical within research attempting to address several constructs (e.g., 
multiple aspects of religiosity) within a single study.  Furthermore, the scale has not been 
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.  Some of the items may be superfluous if the same 
level of internal reliability can be attained with fewer items.  Accordingly, our primary goal was 
to develop an equally reliable short-form of the MFDA scale with comparable levels of 
construct, convergent, and incremental validity as the long-form.  Beyond this, we sought to 
extend previous application of this scale to explore its role in shaping attitudes toward atheists, 
who by their disbelief challenge the notion that morality is founded on divine authority.   
Divine Command Beliefs and Anti-Atheist Prejudice 
Atheists are among the most loathed and distrusted groups in the U.S. (Edgell et al., 
2006; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011), prompting increasing attention toward anti-atheist 
prejudice in recent research (see Gervais, 2013).  Gervais et al. (2011) found that negative 
attitudes toward atheists, at least in North America, revolve specifically around moral distrust; 
however, it is not entirely clear why atheists are distrusted.  Some evidence from Gervais et al. 
suggests it is because atheists are thought to lack the same moral motivations as theists, by virtue 
of not believing in an afterlife or fearing God’s punishment.  However, it may also be because 
atheists are perceived to lack a codified moral system, transmitted through the teachings of a 
religious community and holy texts, rendering them “moral wildcards” without a firm, moral 
foundation to their actions (see Gervais, 2013; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009).  This directly 
implicates Divine Command beliefs in anti-atheist prejudice: If distrust of atheists emerges 
chiefly from the perception that atheists lack a firm moral system to guide their actions and 
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decisions, then the belief that morality comes from God should be a strong factor in shaping 
attitudes toward nonbelievers.   
In the present research, we extend Gervais and colleagues’ perspective by testing whether 
anti-atheist prejudice is predominantly exhibited by individuals who believe that morality 
originates with God.  This would be consistent with the view that it is the perception that atheists 
lack a moral foundation that really underlies anti-atheist prejudice.  Thus, our investigation of 
anti-atheist prejudice allowed us to test not only the predictive validity of the MFDA instrument 
but also the hypothesis—posited by Gervais and colleagues—that moral distrust is fundamental 
to anti-atheist prejudice.   
Hypotheses. We made two hypotheses concerning anti-atheist prejudice: First, we 
hypothesized that belief in divine moral authority (measured via the MFDA scale) is the specific 
aspect of religiosity most strongly associated with anti-atheist prejudice.  Second, we 
hypothesized that divine moral authority beliefs would correlate more strongly with moral 
evaluations of atheists compared to other types of evaluations—for example, ratings of atheists’ 
competence or sociability.  
As a related yet exploratory concern, in Study 1a we also investigated the role of Divine 
Command beliefs in attitudes toward science.  At least in the U.S., science and religion compete 
for explanatory space and cultural authority, and are thus are locked in a sometimes-turbulent 
battle (e.g., Preston & Epley, 2009).  Accordingly, Gauchat (2015) found that religious 
believers—particularly those who endorse literal interpretation of scripture—are less likely to 
endorse the cultural authority of science.  People who endorse scripture as containing the 
foundations of morality might distrust science also for fear that naturalism/empiricism will erode 
the moral tenets upon which their faith is grounded.  Thus, we speculated that individuals who 
BELIEF IN DIVINE MORAL AUTHORITY 
10 
 
endorse Divine Command beliefs might be more distrusting of science because they see secular 
science as a threat to religion’s cultural/moral authority.  
Item Selection and Scale Validation 
We originally aimed to reduce the 20-item scale to around 7-8 items.  To determine 
which items to retain, we sought an approach that was conceptually driven (i.e., observing the 
various contents and concerns within each item) but also statistically validated.   
Conceptual basis for item selection.  In Piazza and Landy’s (2013) original work, the 
full 20-item scale was highly reliable (α = .98) and tapped a unitary construct (a single factor 
explained 71.20% of total variance).  Despite such evidence for a single factor, we noticed subtle 
variation across the items regarding their conceptual contents; for example, items appear to 
encompass at least two related aspects of moral pessimism: (a) pessimism about human 
knowledge (people lack the necessary knowledge to be moral and thus should follow God’s 
authority); and (b) pessimism about human behavior (people will inevitably err if they attempt to 
be good on their own).  Given the high factor loadings of all 20 items, we decided that an 
optimal approach to scale reduction was to ensure that the final selection of items adequately 
covered the diverse conceptual matter of the original scale.  (We also sought to retain one or two 
reverse-scored items, to reduce the impact of acquiescence bias.)  We focused on the various 
ways in which the items addressed beliefs about God’s role in shaping human morality.  At face 
value, the items appear to conceptually cover at least three different types of concern:  
1. Whether moral knowledge/certainty is accessible only by God (moral knowledge) 
2. Whether people can do the right thing without God’s help (moral behavior) 
3. Whether God determines what is morally right/wrong (divine determinacy) 
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There is of course conceptual overlap between these three types of beliefs; for example, the third 
category is very similar to the first, but ascribes even more power to divine mandate.  Indeed, 
some scale items cover more than one type of concern.  Nevertheless, there are subtle conceptual 
differences between each category of items; hence, neglecting a certain category might lead to a 
scale with a limited capacity to capture between-person variability in beliefs about divine origins 
of morality.  It was thus important that our final selection of items adequately addressed each 
subtly different type of Divine Command belief.  Our final selection of items based on this 
criterion is displayed in Table 1 (see Study 1a for the process that led to a final selection of only 
five of these items).   
 Scale validation.  We sought to establish a shortened version of the MFDA that meets 
the following criteria.  First, the scale should demonstrate construct validity—the items should 
be internally reliable and should tap a single construct (as with the 20-item scale).  Second, the 
scale should demonstrate convergent validity—it should be strongly associated with various 
measures of religiosity, such as religious attendance, religious identity, and Biblical literalism; it 
should also moderately correlate with measures that are conceptually related to and typically 
associated with religiosity, such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and the moral 
foundations of Authority, Ingroup Loyalty, and Sanctity (Graham & Haidt, 2010).  Finally, the 
scale should demonstrate incremental validity—it should predict relevant constructs (e.g., non-
utilitarian moral decision-making) independent of other factors that have been shown to be 








Items selected for the shortened Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale, and factor 











1 Everything we need to know about living a moral life 
God has revealed to us 
1, 2 .904 .947 
4 What is morally good and right is what God says is good 
and right 
3 .929 .948 
7 If you want to know how to live a moral life you should 
look to God 
1, 2 .864 .930 
9 Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids 
them 
3 .833 .916 
13 Right and wrong can never be explained with human 
logic, they can only come from God’s commands 
1, 3 - - 
14 Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to 
know right from wrong 
1 - - 
17 It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of 
God’s laws* 
1, 2 .626 .691 
19 Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish 
right from wrong* 
1 - - 
Note: Types of Concern as follows: 
1= whether moral knowledge/certainty is accessible only by God;  
2= whether people can do the right thing without God’s help;  
3= whether God determines what is morally right/wrong. 
*Reverse-scored;  †Confirmatory Factor Analysis;  ^Principal Components Analysis without rotation; 
- indicates items that were removed in Study 1a to increase model fit. 
 
STUDY 1a:  
Scale Reduction and Confirmatory Analysis with U.S. Religious Believers 
In Study 1a we sought to establish the construct validity of a shortened scale via 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).  Beyond this, we tested the scale’s convergent validity by 
observing correlations with existing measures of religiosity.  We also tested the scale’s 
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incremental validity by observing associations with anti-atheist prejudice and trait ratings of 
atheists on the dimensions of morality, sociability, and competence (we expected the MFDA 
scale to correlate most strongly with morality ratings of atheists).  Finally, for exploratory 
purposes we included measures addressing Biblical literalism and beliefs about the cultural 
authority of science.  
Method 
Participants 
 Three-hundred and four U.S. participants completed an online survey hosted by 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for $0.50 compensation.  We recruited only those who initially 
reported believing in God to avoid attaining skewed results (floor effect) from non-theists.  We 
removed eight participants from analysis for responding incorrectly to any two of three attention-
check items (e.g., “click 5 so we know you’re paying attention”), and a further three participants 
for claiming to not believe in God.  This left a total sample of 293 participants (107 males, 185 
females, one preferring not to say), Mage = 36.3, SD = 13.4.  Participants’ religious identifications 
were as follows: 226 Christians (76.7%), 3 Jews (1.0%), 2 Hindus (.7%), 11 Muslims (3.8%), 4 
Buddhists (1.4%), 21 selecting “other” (7.2%), and 27 agnostics (9.2%; self-identifying 
agnostics, like all other participants, claimed to believe in God).   
Materials 
 We included only the focal eight MFDA items from the larger 20 item scale; participants 
responded on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale (mean scores presented in 
Results).  We also included a measure of Biblical literalism (Gauchat, 2015): Participants were 
asked “Which of the following comes closest to describing your feelings about the bible?”: 0 = 
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The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men; 50 
= Unsure/undecided; 100 = The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, 
word for word (M = 55.23, SD = 34.48).  Our other measures of religiosity included a measure of 
Religious Attendance (“How often do you attend religious services, apart from social obligations 
such as weddings or funerals?” 1 = never, 6 = every week or more than once a week; M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.70), a measure of Prayer Frequency (1 = never, 7 = more than once a day; M = 4.82, SD 
= 2.03), and Preston and Epley’s (2005) four-item measure of belief in God (e.g., “How 
confident are you that God exists?”; 1 = not at all, 11 = extremely; α = .97; M = 8.24, SD = 
2.90).  
To assess anti-atheist prejudice, we used Gervais’ (2011) 7-item Negative Attitudes 
Toward Atheists (NATA) scale (e.g., “I would be uncomfortable with an atheist teaching my 
child”; α = .89; M = 3.85, SD = 1.50).  We also included a list of 19 traits taken from Landy, 
Piazza, and Goodwin (in preparation)1 (1 = doesn’t describe atheists well at all, 9 = describes 
atheists very well).  We included Gauchat’s (2015) two-item measure of beliefs about the 
cultural authority of science: “Even if it brings no immediate benefits, scientific research that 
advances the frontiers of knowledge is necessary and should be supported by the federal 
government” (reverse-scored) and “Science is too concerned with theory and speculation to be of 
much use in making concrete government policy decisions that will affect the way we live” (1= 
strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree).  These two items (r = .48, p <.001) were averaged to form 
a measure of Negative Attitudes toward Science (NATS; high scores indicate an opposition to 
science; M = 2.63, SD = 1.20).  
 To address participants’ moral values, we included the standard 30-item Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), comprised of two subscales across the five foundations (see 
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Graham et al., 2011).  Items pertaining to each foundation were collapsed to form measures of 
foundation endorsement (αs = .65-.86).   
Participants also completed a 15-item measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; 
Zakrisson, 2005), measuring respect for and strict deference to tradition and authority (e.g., 
“God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too 
late; violations must be punished”; α = .90; M = 3.52, SD = 1.20).  Basic demographics were also 
assessed, including two items assessing political ideology: “What is your political stance 
regarding social issues?” and “What is your political stance regarding economic issues?” (1= 
extreme left, 6= centrist, 11= extreme right; Ms = 5.68 and 6.21, SDs = 2.90 and 2.80, 
respectively).   
Procedure 
To avoid the possible impact of order effects (e.g., presenting MFDA first might increase 
anti-atheist prejudice) we used a nuanced randomization procedure.  First, measures of MFDA, 
distrust of science, and Biblical literalism were presented in randomized order.  Second, we 
randomized presentation order of measures of anti-atheist prejudice (the NATA scale and the list 
of 19 traits).  Then, these two sets of measures were presented in random order.  Following this, 
participants completed the MFQ, RWA, provided demographic information, and were then 
debriefed.  Within each measure, item order was randomized across participants.   
Results 
 The eight-item MFDA scale was reliable (α = .93) and normally distributed: M = 4.90, 
SD = 2.20, skewness = -.017 (SE = .142).   
Construct Validity 
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We first subjected the eight MFDA items to a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE; the most common method of estimation in CFA and 
appropriate for continuous, normally distributed variables; Brown, 2015).  In line with an EFA of 
the full 20-item scale (Piazza & Landy, 2013), a one-factor solution consistently provided better 
fit than a two- or three-factor solution (we tested for two- and three-factor solutions by 
categorizing items based on the three putative components of Divine Command Theory 
discussed in the Introduction; see Table 1).  Nevertheless, even in a one-factor solution the eight 
items yielded inadequate fit.  We thus sought to improve model fit by removing problematic 
items one at a time.   
 All items yielded acceptable factor loadings (all >.50; see Table 1), suggesting that the 
poor fit was due to inter-item redundancies (i.e., certain items might be unnecessary if their 
content is adequately covered in another item).  We therefore inspected modification indices, 
which reveal whether certain items share overlapping variance not accounted for by the target 
factor.  Items revealing particularly large overlap with other items were deleted, one at a time, 
beginning with the most apparently problematic items (see Table 2).  We relied on several 
contrasting criteria in order to optimize model fit, namely: (a) a Chi-square test to ensure 
adequate fit between the observed and expected covariance matrices (and a Normed Chi-square 
test to account for the impact of degrees of freedom); (b) the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) to ensure adequate approximation of the model to population 
characteristics; (c) a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) to indicate model improvement over a baseline 
model that assumes zero population covariances among the observed variables; and (d) the 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) to index the mean absolute correlation 
residual (i.e., the overall difference between the observed and predicted correlations).   
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A five-item solution was the only outcome that satisfied all criteria for “good” model 
fitness (see Table 2 table notes). This was the only solution that satisfied all four goodness-of-fit 
criteria.  Importantly, this five-item solution retains one reverse-scored item, thus reducing 
concerns regarding acquiescence bias.  Moreover, the scale adequately covers the various 
conceptual concerns that we used as an initial guide to scale reduction (see Table 1).  It also 
showed strong inter-item reliability (α = .92).  We therefore settled on this five-item scale and 
sought to validate it in further analyses.  Like the 8-item scale, this 5-item scale was normally 
distributed—M = 5.32, SD = 2.34, skewness = -.237 (SE = .142).  As the mean approximated the 
scale midpoint, participants on average gave neutral responses to statements about the divine 
origins of morality.    
Table 2 
Confirmatory factor analysis to determine a final scale with good model fit (Study 1a). 
Fitness 
Criterion 
8 items 7 items 
(item 19 removed) 
6 items 
(items 19 & 14 
removed) 
5 items 
(items 19, 14, & 13 
removed) 
χ2 test of model 
fit (df) 
150.85 (20) 
p < .001 
92.63 (14) 
p < .001 
46.71 (9) 
p < .001 
7.68 (5) 
p = .178 
Normed χ2  
(χ2 ∕ df) 
7.54 6.62 5.19 1.54 
RMSEA .149 .138 .120 .043 
90% CI .128, .172 .112, .166 .087, .155 .000, .099 
p (RMSEA 
≤ .05) 
<.001 <.001 <.001 .509 
CFI .910 .946 .972 .998 
SRMR .064 .043 .032 .015 
“Good” fit indicated by: 
χ2: p >.05; Normed χ2< 2.0; RMSEA<.05; CFI >.950; and SRMR<.06. 
 




 All zero-order correlations are displayed in Table 3.   As expected, MFDA was strongly 
associated with measures of religiosity (Biblical Literalism, Prayer Frequency, Religious 
Attendance, and Belief in God) and RWA (which shares in common with MFDA concerns for 
hierarchical deference and traditional religious order), and was moderately-to-strongly correlated 
with the two moral foundations that moralize deference to superiors and purity/sanctity.  
Additionally, MFDA was very strongly associated with NATA, suggesting that Divine 
Command beliefs and anti-atheist prejudice, although distinct constructs, share a large degree of 
overlap (this is also despite the fact that, unlike in the original scale, no MFDA item explicitly 
mentioned atheists).  
We then assessed the varying role of MFDA in predicting different types of beliefs about 
atheists.  We categorized traits based on conceptual criteria and formed composites addressing 
perceived atheist Morality, Moral-competence, Sociability, and Competence (see Footnote 1 for 
details; all αs >.88).2  Means (and SDs) were 5.25 (1.87), 5.18 (1.77), 5.55 (1.61), and 5.59 
(1.74), respectively (1-9 scale; high scores indicate positive appraisals).  Consistent with the 
notion that moral distrust underlies anti-atheist prejudice (Gervais, 2013), the strongest 
correlations emerged between MFDA and moral trait ratings of atheists: rs = -.47, -.43, -.30, and 
-.35, respectively, all ps <.001; that is, Divine Command beliefs were most associated with 
negative views about atheists’ moral character, as opposed to other aspects of their personality or 
intelligence.  To provide an even stronger test of the hypothesis, we used the approach outlined 
by Lee and Preacher (2013) to compare relative strengths of correlations.  The correlation with 
Morality was stronger than all other correlations, all zs >2.36, ps (2-tailed) <.018.  In addition, 
MFDA correlated with Moral-competence more strongly than with either Sociability or 
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Competence, zs >2.53, ps <.012 (and with Competence more strongly than with Sociability, z 
=1.99, p =.047).  Hence, MFDA was most strongly associated with the perception that atheists 
lack moral character, including competence traits with a distinctly moral flavor.   
Incremental Validity3 
We reasoned that MFDA should be the strongest unique predictor of attitudes toward 
atheists because atheism represents the antithesis of divine command beliefs.  Multiple 
regressions are displayed in Table 4.  As expected, MFDA explained more variability in NATA 
compared to all other measures.   
We also explored the role of MFDA in explaining beliefs about the cultural authority of 
science, as past research has found that religious believers are less likely to endorse science’s 
cultural authority (e.g., Gauchat, 2015).  Consistent with expectations, MFDA was consistently a 
unique (and positive) predictor of negative attitudes toward science.  Only measures pertaining to 
political ideology explained more variance than MFDA, and even here, when ideology covariates 
were addressed separately alongside MFDA, MFDA was always the stronger predictor, even 
compared to RWA (βMFDA = .56, βRWA = .37, ps<.001).  Hence, belief in divine moral authority is 
a central factor in explaining religious believers’ attitudes toward science.   
  




Zero-order correlations (Study 1a). 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.  
1. MFDA .84° .46° .83° .51° .55° .73° .55° .38° .72° - -.17† .40° .48° .73° 
2. NATA  .48° .76° .48° .52° .69° .58° .41° .78° - -.15† .40° .49° .72° 
3. NATS   .45° .24° .22° .30° .52° .45° .54° -.20† -.30° .29° .33° .43° 
4. Biblical  
   Literalism 
   .50° .48° .63° .52° .33° .65° - -.17† .41° .43° .66° 
5. Religious    
   Attendance 
    .49° .48° .30° .22° .36° - - .25° .23° .41° 
6. Prayer   
   Frequency 
     .73° .28° .13* .36° - - .12* .17† .37° 
7. Belief in   
   God 
      .38° .23° .50° .10^ - .26° .31° .52° 
8. Social 
Conservatism 
       .75° .63° -.18† -.31° .38° .48° .53° 
9. Economic 
Conservatism 
        .45° -.25° -.33° .36° .39 .34 
10. RWA          - -.28° .51° .62° .75° 
Moral Foundations:              
11. Care           .62° .13* - - 
12. Fairness            - - - 
13. Loyalty             .62° .46° 
14. Authority              .61° 
15. Sanctity               
To reduce cluttering, we exclude rs<.10 (all pertinent ps >.10). 
MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; NATA=Negative Attitudes Toward Atheists; NATS= 
Negative Attitudes Toward Science; RWA=Right-Wing Authoritarianism;  
^p<.10;  *p<.05;  †p<.01;  °p<.001 
 
  



















.83*** .69 .48*** .23*** 
Religiosity 
MFDA .53*** - .36*** - 
Religious   






  Frequency 
.01 -.02 
Belief in God .18** -.06 
Biblical  




MFDA .55*** - .14* - 
Social   




.13*** Economic  
  Conservatism 
.02 .17* 
RWA .34*** .26** 
Moral 
Foundations 





Fairness -.04 -.18** 
Loyalty -.02 .07 
Authority .06 .07 
Sanctity .23*** .18* 
MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; NATA=Negative Attitudes Toward Atheists; 
NATS=Negative Attitudes Toward Science; 




 In Study 1a we established and validated a shortened, 5-item measure of Divine 
Command beliefs.  This measure met all our criteria for scale validity.  Moreover, we found 
novel support for the notion that moral distrust drives anti-atheist prejudice (Gervais, 2013; 
Gervais et al., 2011).  MFDA beliefs consistently formed the strongest predictor of negative 
attitudes toward atheists, even when entered into models alongside several other measures of 
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religiosity, measures of ideology, or measures of moral values.  Although MFDA did not fully 
mediate the effects of all covariates, it drastically reduced their effect sizes.  For example, strong 
correlations between the four religiosity covariates and NATA (rs = .48-.76) were reduced to βs 
= .01-.20.  MFDA was consistently the strongest predictor, suggesting that beliefs about the 
divine origins of morality are central to anti-atheist prejudice.   
We also found novel evidence that Divine Command beliefs predict negative attitudes 
toward science.  Although we replicated Gauchat’s (2015) key finding that Biblical literalism 
significantly and uniquely predicted negative attitudes toward science, we found MFDA to be an 
even stronger predictor.  This suggests that although generally held beliefs in the literal truth of 
the Bible are important in religious believers’ attitudes toward science, it is the Biblical 
literalists’ concerns about how science may challenge the religious foundations of morality that 
are really cause for their distrust.  
 
STUDY 1b: Replication with an Indian Hindu Sample 
 In Study 1b we sought further support for the shortened MFDA scale’s incremental 
validity.  We ran a study similar to Study 1a in that the focus was on attitudes toward atheists.  
However, we ran the study with a sample of Indian Hindus, who believe in a supreme God that 
takes on various forms (pantheism).  Study 1b represents the first attempt at validating the 
MFDA outside of a Western, Judeo-Christian context—an important step in testing the cultural 
bounds of divine command beliefs.  
Method 
Participants 
BELIEF IN DIVINE MORAL AUTHORITY 
23 
 
 Eighty-three participants in India took part online via Mechanical Turk and received 
$0.40 compensation.  We removed six participants who answered any two of three attention-
check items incorrectly, leaving a final sample of 77 participants (51 males), Mage = 32.5, SD = 
9.0.  Only two participants did not identify as Hindu (one ‘atheist’, one ‘other’), and a further 
five claimed to not believe in “a God or Gods”.  Removing these participants did not affect the 
direction or significance of any effect  (moreover, as Hindus tend to place relatively greater 
emphasis on religious practice rather than deistic belief compared to U.S. Christians—e.g., 
Hughes et al. [2015]—we were reluctant to remove these participants based on their lack of 
deistic belief.)  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants first completed the 7-item NATA scale (α = .74; M = 4.02, SD = .94).  They 
then completed the full, 20-item version of the MFDA (this study was conducted prior to Study 
1a, hence the inclusion of the full, original scale).  The focal five items derived from the CFA in 
Study 1a were reliable (α = .81), and participants tended to respond near the scale midpoint (M = 
5.45, SD = 1.44).   
Participants then completed the same 15-item measure of RWA as in Study 1a (α = .78; 
M = 4.87, SD = .67).  They then provided demographic information.  Measures addressing 
Religious Attendance (M = 4.29, SD = 1.30), Prayer Frequency (M = 5.33, SD = 1.67), Preston 
and Epley’s (2005) four-item measure of belief in God (α = .96; M = 8.26, SD = 2.43), and 
social/economic conservatism (Ms = 6.93 and 6.95, SDs = 2.32 and 2.47, respectively) were the 
same as in Study 1a.  (The survey also included the 30-item MFQ, but we excluded MFQ scores 
from analyses because the scales were unreliable in this sample of Indian Hindus.)  
Results and Discussion 
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MFDA’s zero-order associations (Table 5) were very similar to those in Study 1a (Table 
3).  NATA was significantly associated with all religiosity covariates; unexpectedly, however, it 
was not significantly associated with any ideology covariate.  Nevertheless, we explored whether 
MFDA would predict NATA independently of these covariates (see Table 6).  Overall, the 
effects of MFDA were robust to the inclusion of all covariates, and MFDA was consistently the 
strongest predictor of NATA.  Moreover, despite strong zero-order associations between the 
religiosity covariates and NATA, MFDA explained the majority of variance in NATA and 
reduced the effects of all religiosity covariates apart from Belief in God to non-significance.  
Furthermore, in models including MFDA and only a single covariate, MFDA was consistently 
significant and the strongest unique predictor.   
These results replicate findings from Study 1a in showing that the belief that morality 
comes directly from God is the strongest predictor of attitudes toward atheists.  The similar 
patterns of results across Studies 1a/1b suggest that results are not artifacts of sample size and are 








Zero-order correlations (Study 1b). 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. MFDA .67*** .50*** .48*** .62*** .25* .22^ .25* 
2. NATA  .41*** .54*** .55*** .17 .13 .18 
3. Religious 
Attendance 
  .62*** .68*** .33** .26* .16 
4. Prayer 
Frequency 
   .76*** .26* .23* .01 
5. Belief in 
God 
    .38*** .36** .18 
6. Social 
Conservatism  
     .85*** .33** 
7. Economic 
Conservatism 
      .33* 
8. RWA        
^p<.06;  *p<.05;  **p<.01; ***p<.001.   
MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; NATA=Negative Attitudes Toward  




Step-wise regressions: MFDA, ideology, and religiosity predicting  
negative attitudes toward atheists (Study 1b). 
Covariate Set Predictor 
Variable 
β R2 change 
- MFDA .66***  
Religiosity 
MFDA .51*** - 
Religious 
  Attendance 
-.05 
.06* Prayer  
  Frequency 
.28* 
Belief in God .05 
Political Ideology 
MFDA .65*** - 
Social  
  Conservatism 
.07 
.002 Economic  
  Conservatism 
-.09 
RWA .03 
MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; 
*p<.05; ***p<.001. 
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STUDY 2: Divine Command Theory and Moral Cognition 
 Our goals in Studies 2a-2b were to (a) further demonstrate convergent and incremental 
validity of the 5-item MFDA scale using an alternative set of measures and (b) demonstrate the 
utility of this scale in explaining variability in morally relevant constructs independent of other 
measures of religiosity.  In Study 2a, we reanalyzed a preexisting data set from Piazza and Landy 
(2013, Study 1) now using only the five MFDA items derived from Study 1a.  The aim was to 
show that the MFDA short-form correlated sensibly with other measures of religiosity, yet 
predicted moral attitudes—in particular, non-utilitarian decision-making—independent of other 
religiosity measures.  Study 2b was a new study in which we tested whether MFDA would 
uniquely predict a prohibitive orientation toward morality.  
Study 2a 
Method 
Participants and materials. Piazza and Landy’s (2013; Study 1) dataset included 290 
U.S. adults (136 male, Mage = 34.0 years, SD = 11.4) recruited online.  The measures included (a) 
several measures of religiosity: the original 20-item MFDA scale, the Short Christian Orthodoxy 
scale, Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire, Attitude toward Religion scale, and 
self-reported religiosity (single item); (b) the 12-item Revised Scale of Social Conservatism for 
use with U.S. samples (scores ranged from 0-1); (c) Actively Open-minded Thinking scale; (d) a 
44-item Big Five Inventory (the 20-item MFDA only weakly correlated with Big Five 
personality traits, so this measure will not be discussed further); and (e) Piazza and Sousa’s 
(2013) Consequentialist Thinking Style scale.  (For further details, see Piazza and Landy, 2013, 
Study 1.)  
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Consequentialist Thinking Style represented our main dependent measure.  Participants 
responded to 14 questions in which they indicated whether a rule violation (e.g., lying, torture, 
breaking promises) was “never morally permissible” (deontological response), “permissible if it 
produces more good than bad” (weak utilitarian response), or “obligatory if it produces more 
good than bad” (strong utilitarian response).  Following Piazza and Landy (2013), responses to 
the 14 items were averaged with scores ranging from 1-3 (higher scores representing a stronger 
commitment to utilitarian thinking).  
Results 
Internal reliability. We conducted a principal components factor analysis on the five 
MFDA items, without rotation.  This produced a single-factor solution (eigenvalue =3.98, 
explaining 79.54% of the total variance; the second eigenvalue was .59), α =.94.   
Convergent validity. The MFDA short-form correlated strongly with the Short Christian 
Orthodoxy Scale, r(289) = .87, the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire, r(289) 
= .87, the Attitudes towards Religion scale, r(289) = .77, and Social Conservatism, ρ(289) = .70.  
These correlations are very similar to those reported by Piazza and Landy (2013, Study 1) using 
the 20-item MFDA.  
Incremental validity.  The MFDA short-form correlated negatively with the Actively 
Open-minded Thinking scale, r(289) = -.70 (i.e., endorsement of God as moral authority 
correlated with being less actively open-minded), and with Consequentialist Thinking Style, 
r(289) = -.49 (i.e., endorsement of God as moral authority negatively correlated with utilitarian 
thinking), both ps <.001.  To test the incremental validity of the MFDA short-form, we 
conducted a regression analysis entering the MFDA short-form into a model simultaneously with 
other measures of religiosity (Christian Orthodoxy, Strength of Religious Faith, Attitudes toward 
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Religion, and self-reported religiosity) predicting Consequentialist Thinking Style scores (R2 = 
.248).  MFDA emerged as the only significant independent predictor of CTS, β = -.37, t(284) = -
3.17, p = .002, all other βs <.15, ts <1.09, ps >.27.  When Actively Open-minded Thinking was 
added to the model (R2 = .258, R2change = .01), the MFDA short-form remained a significant 
independent predictor of consequentialist thinking style, β = -.28, t(283) = -2.25, p = .025, and 
Actively Open-minded Thinking was a marginal, independent predictor, β = .14, t(283) = 1.92, p 
= .056.  
Discussion 
The 5-item MFDA behaved very much like the 20-item MFDA as in Piazza and Landy 
(2013); it converged with other measures of religiosity and discriminantly predicted an important 
outcome related to moral cognition: deontological thinking.  Replicating the findings of Piazza 
and Landy, the 5-item MFDA even predicted a non-utilitarian thinking style independent of 
Actively Open-minded Thinking.  Overall, Study 2a extends the findings of Study 1 to 
demonstrate further evidence of the MFDA short-form’s convergent validity given strong 
correlations with measures of religiosity not included in Study 1, and its incremental validity 
when predicting a widely studied aspect of moral cognition.  Study 2b sought to test the 
incremental validity of the MFDA short-form with regard to yet another facet of moral cognition.  
Study 2b 
Prohibitive moral rules specify what is obligatory not to do (e.g., “Do not kill”; “Do not 
lie”), while prescriptive moral rules specify what is obligatory to do (e.g., “Strive to save lives”; 
“Strive to tell the truth”).  Past research by Janoff-Bulman and colleagues has shown that 
individuals vary in terms of their relative orientation toward prohibitive and prescriptive moral 
rules (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).  Individuals with an avoidant or inhibitive 
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self-regulatory style tend to exhibit a predominantly prohibitive moral orientation, whereas 
individuals with a more approach-oriented or active self-regulatory style tend to exhibit a 
prescriptive moral orientation (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  As far as we are aware, no research 
to date has examined whether religious belief or participating in a religious community might 
encourage a prohibitive or prescriptive moral orientation.  However, we surmise that a belief in 
divine moral authority might encourage a prohibitive moral orientation insofar as many divine 
commands or religious-based moral codes (e.g., the Ten Commandments) tend to be framed as 
prohibitions (e.g., “Thou shalt not kill”; “Thou shalt not commit adultery”; “Thou shalt not 
steal”; see Deuteronomy 5:4-21; Exodus 20:1-17, KJV), while much fewer divine commands are 
framed as prescriptions (one exception being, “Honor thy father and mother”), at least within 
Judeo-Christian traditions.  
In keeping with this theorizing, in Study 2b we tested whether MFDA might uniquely 
predict a prohibitive moral orientation independent of other aspects of religiosity.  We were less 
sure about the relationship between MFDA and a prescriptive orientation, yet we included a 
measure of this variable for exploratory purposes.   
Method 
 Participants. We recruited a new sample of 261 participants via Mechanical Turk (116 
female; Mage = 36.2 years, SD = 11.3; we aimed to recruit a minimum of 250).  Recruitment was 
limited to individuals located in the U.S.; 47% reported a Christian affiliation (Evangelical, 
Protestant, Catholic, or Other), 3% Jewish, 5% Personality Spirituality, 3% Other religion, 5% 
None/no religion, 17% Agnostic, and 20% Atheist.  Participants received $0.50 compensation.   
 Prohibitive and prescriptive morality. Participants rated the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with 30 statements “about what a person is ‘morally required’ to do,” using a 
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7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). Half of the statements were framed as 
prohibitive rules; the other half were framed as prescriptive rules (see Appendix A, for all 30 
items and descriptive statistics).  The rules were designed to cover a wide range of moral themes 
and content, with corresponding prohibitive and prescriptive rules for each theme (e.g., not 
stealing vs. giving to charity, respectively).  Both sets of rules exhibited high reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .92, .95, respectively).  
MFDA and other religiosity measures. The MFDA short-form was answered in terms 
of level of agreement, this time on a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) scale.  The 
internal reliability was high (α = .91).  The mean (3.18, SD = 2.02) was lower than in Studies 1a-
1b likely due to the recruitment of non-theists, in addition to theists, driving down the scores.  To 
assess the convergent and incremental validity of the MFDA beyond what has already been 
demonstrated in Studies 1-2a, we included the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL; Koenig 
& Büssing, 2010), a widely used 5-item index of religiosity.  The DUREL has been used in over 
100 studies and has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of three major dimensions of 
religiosity.  The first item assesses a person’s involvement in Organizational Religious Activity: 
“How often do you attend church or other religious meetings?” (1= Never, 6= More than once a 
week; M = 2.30, SD = 1.56).  The second item measures involvement in Non-Organizational 
Religious Activities: “How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such as prayer, 
meditation, or Bible study?” (1 = Rarely/never, 6 = More than once a day; M = 2.38, SD = 1.79).  
The final three items, averaged together, assesses religious identification or Intrinsic Religiosity: 
“In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., God)”; “My religious beliefs are what 
really lie behind my whole approach to life”; “I try hard to carry my religion over into all other 
dealings in life” (1 = Definitely not true of me, 5 = Definitely true of me; α = .93; M = 2.55, SD = 
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1.47).  The three DUREL subscales were substantially correlated (see Table 7), and correlated 
with MFDA (see Table 7); as a conservative test of the MFDA scale’s incremental validity, we 
treated the subscales as separate dimensions in our main analysis.  
Procedure. Participants rated the 30 moral rules and then completed the MFDA short-
form and DUREL along with other demographic questions.  Afterwards, they were debriefed and 
paid.  
Results and Discussion 
Endorsement of the MFDA had a moderate zero-order correlation with both prohibitive 
and prescriptive moral orientations (see Table 7).  The DUREL subscales were also correlated 
with prohibitive and prescriptive orientations, particularly Intrinsic Religiosity, which had the 
largest correlations.  Additionally, the prescriptive and prohibitive scales were themselves highly 
correlated, reflecting a general orientation toward moral rules among many participants.  
Table 7 
Zero-order correlations (Study 2b). 
Variable 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. MFDA .65 .72 .85 .43 .37 
2. Organizational  
    Religious Activities 
- .65 .70 .21 .22 
3. Non-organizational   
    Religious Activities 
- - .79 .31 .28 
4. Intrinsic religiosity - - - .40 .38 
5. Prohibitive moral 
    orientation 
- - - - .90 
6. Prescriptive moral 
    orientation 
- - - - - 
Note. All correlations: p<.001.  N=261.  MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; Religiosity 
measures from Duke University Religion Index.  
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To test for incremental validity, we conducted two separate step-wise regressions, the 
first with prohibitive morality as the outcome variable, and the second with prescriptive morality.  
For both analyses, we first regressed the MFDA short-form and the demographic variables 
(gender, political orientation, and level of education) onto the outcome variable.  Gender, 
political orientation, and education were included in Step 1, as they have been shown to be 
relevant for moral outcomes in past studies (e.g., Piazza, 2012).  Second, we added the religiosity 
measures (DUREL) to the analysis.  As expected, MFDA predicted a prohibitive orientation to 
morality independent of gender, political orientation, education, and various aspects of religiosity 
(see Table 8).  Being female was also an independent predictor of prohibitive morality.  
Additionally, MFDA predicted a prescriptive orientation independent of these variables, but only 
to a marginal extent (see Table 9).  Gender and intrinsic religiosity were stronger predictors of 
prescriptive morality than of prohibitive morality.   
In short, a belief that morality is founded on divine authority uniquely predicted having a 
prohibitive orientation toward morality, independent of other aspects of religiosity and relevant 
demographic factors, but was at best only a marginally significant unique predictor of having a 
prescriptive orientation toward morality.  This further highlights the predictive value and 
incremental validity of the MFDA short-form as a factor contributing to moral cognition.  
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Table 8  
Step-wise Regression: MFDA, demographic, and religiosity variables predicting a  
prohibitive moral orientation (Study 2b). 
 Variables β t R2 
Step 1 -
Demographics 
   .210 
 MFDA .38 6.03***  
 Female .17 2.90**  
 Political conservatism .02 <1  
 Education -.02 <1  
Step 2 - 
Religiosity 
   .221 
 MFDA .36 3.26**  
 Female .15 2.51*  
 Political conservatism .02 <1  
 Education -.01 <1  
 Organizational religious  
  activity 
-.13 -1.51  
 Non-organizational  
  religious activity 
-.05 <1  
 Intrinsic religiosity  .16 1.28  
*p<.05;  **p<.01; ***p<.001.  MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; Religiosity measures 
from Duke University Religion Index.  
  




Step-wise Regression: MFDA, demographic, and religiosity variables predicting a  
prescriptive moral orientation (Study 2b). 
 Variables β t R2 
Step 1 - 
Demographics 
   .182 
 MFDA .32 4.99***  
 Female .21 3.53***  
 Political conservatism .01 <1  
 Education -.03 <1  
Step 2 – 
Religiosity 
   .197 
 MFDA .21 1.86^  
 Female .19 3.05**  
 Political conservatism .00 <1  
 Education -.05 <1  
 Organizational religious  
  activity 
-.05 <1  
 Non-organizational  
  religious activity 
-.12 -1.23  
 Intrinsic religiosity .27 2.06*  
^p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  MFDA=5-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; Religiosity 
measures from Duke University Religion Index.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In this paper we have established and validated a shortened version of a scale measuring 
beliefs about the divine origins of morality, reducing a large, 20-item scale to a much more 
practical 5-item scale.   
We began by addressing the diverse conceptual content of the original 20-item scale, 
ensuring that the reduced scale adequately captures a range of Divine Command beliefs.  
Accordingly, the final 5-item scale includes items addressing beliefs about whether (a) God has 
exclusive access to moral knowledge/certainty, (b) people can behave morally without God’s 
help, and (c) God actually determines what is morally right/wrong (see Table 1).  Although each 
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consideration is conceptually associated, and although statistically they tap a single dimension, 
subtle differences in their content cautioned us to cover all three in the finalized scale.   
We then proceeded to test the scale’s psychometric properties.  The scale consistently 
showed strong construct and convergent validity—we consistently obtained a single, reliable 
factor, and the instrument typically yielded strong associations with several other measures of 
religiosity.  Moreover, the scale demonstrated exceptional utility, as it was typically the strongest 
unique predictor of a wide range of outcome measures including social attitudes (anti-atheist 
prejudice), attitudes toward social policy (beliefs about the cultural authority of science), and 
moral cognition including orientations toward deontological thinking and prohibitive moral 
rules.  Finally, scale validity was demonstrated across multiple samples of U.S. religious 
believers (also nonbelievers in Study 2b) and one sample of Indian Hindus.   
MFDA, Social Attitudes, and Cultural-Evolutionary Theories of Religiosity 
Results consistently showed that Divine Command beliefs formed the strongest unique 
predictor of anti-atheist prejudice.  Moreover, in Study 1a MFDA was associated with beliefs 
about atheists’ moral traits more strongly than with beliefs about atheists’ amoral traits.  This 
provides novel support for the moral distrust hypothesis of anti-atheist prejudice, which posits 
that religious-based anti-atheist prejudice emerges chiefly from perceptions of atheist 
immorality, mediated through beliefs about divine punishment as a motivator of moral behavior 
(see Gervais et al., 2011).  The present findings show for the first time that beliefs about God as 
moral authority (i.e., God as both the author of morality and the ultimate source of moral 
guidance) are central to anti-atheist prejudice, consistent with the theorizing of Gervais and 
colleagues.  Our findings also support the notion that anti-atheist prejudice is focused on 
perceptions of atheists’ immorality. In Study 1a, mean ratings of atheists’ moral traits were the 
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lowest ratings, and negative correlations between the MFDA and atheists’ moral ratings were 
significantly larger than between the MFDA and other trait dimensions (e.g., competence, 
sociability).  
The moral distrust theory of anti-atheist prejudice emerged from theories regarding the 
cultural-evolutionary origins of religious belief (e.g., Atran & Henrich, 2010; Gervais et al., 
2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan et al., in press).  These theories posit that the historical 
puzzle of how small, kin-based tribal groups expanded to become large-scale societies can be 
explained by the emergence of a shared belief in a moralizing, watchful, punitive deity.  Such a 
belief is theorized to have allowed non-kin to cooperate with and trust one another, as moral 
transgressions and trust violations would have aroused concerns of supernatural punishment, 
whether in this life or the next (see also Johnson & Bering, 2006).  MFDA addresses this 
perspective better than any other measure we are aware of, as it measures not only one’s belief in 
God, but also specifically a belief that God is the ultimate source of moral knowledge and 
instruction.  Hence, this measure will likely be valuable in ongoing research.  For example, 
experimental attempts to reduce anti-atheist prejudice—e.g., by priming participants with secular 
authority (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) or increasing perceived atheist prevalence (Gervais, 
2011)—may be less effective on individuals high in MFDA due to their strong conviction that 
morality depends on faith in God and knowledge of his laws.  
Conflicts between Religion and Science 
Religious and scientific explanations for worldly phenomena are often at odds  (e.g., the 
Earth was either created in six days or it evolved over billions of years; Preston & Epley, 2009).  
As a consequence, devout Biblical literalists are often antagonistic toward science (Gauchat, 
2015).  In the present study, Biblical literalism was indeed a significant unique predictor of 
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attitudes toward science; however, we found MFDA to be a stronger predictor.  This suggests 
that although generally held beliefs in the literal truth of the Bible are important in religious 
believers’ attitudes toward science, beliefs about the divine foundations of morality are 
particularly relevant, as religious adherents may especially fear that secularism undermines the 
moral fabric of society.  However, our current investigation into attitudes toward science was 
exploratory.  We encourage further research into the role of Divine Command beliefs in attitudes 
toward science, using a wider and more nuanced range of measures.   
Moral Cognition 
Studies 2a-2b shed light on how meta-ethical beliefs about the divine origins of morality 
shape aspects of moral cognition.  In Study 2a we replicated past findings (Piazza & Landy, 
2013) regarding the role of meta-ethical beliefs in the inclination to engage in utilitarian moral 
thinking.  Specifically, Divine Command beliefs were central in explaining why religious 
believers are relatively committed to moral rules in the face of utilitarian alternatives.  Consistent 
with Piazza and Sousa’s (2013) rationale, it would seem that religious individuals are often rule-
oriented because they view moral rules as grounded in God’s supreme moral authority.  
In Study 2b we extended these findings to another area of moral cognition—how strongly 
a person endorses prohibitive moral rules.  MFDA significantly and uniquely predicted a 
prohibitive (but not a prescriptive) moral orientation.  We hypothesized this would be the case 
because Divine Commands are typically framed as prohibitions (e.g., “Thou shalt not kill”) 
rather than prescriptions (e.g., “Thou shall strive to save lives”).  While the present study found 
support for this idea, religious belief was also associated, to some extent, with a prescriptive 
moral orientation.  Future research should continue examining the relationship between religion 
and moral orientations using other measures (e.g., see Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  We 
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anticipate that the MFDA scale will be useful in assessing religious-grounded meta-ethical 
beliefs as they relate to a number of moral cognitive outcomes, including the degree to which 
people view moral propositions to be (a) objectively true, (b) universally applicable, and (c) 
unchangeable by human authority.  
Conclusion 
 As religiosity continues to gain more and more attention in the social and personality 
sciences, it is important that researchers are able to address and statistically measure the full 
range of dimensions on which religious believers might vary.  Pragmatism is also important, as 
researchers often face several practical impediments to their research questions such as time 
allowances and concerns for participant fatigue and attention span, all of which impede the 
ability to juxtapose certain constructs against others when testing hypotheses.  In establishing, 
validating, and demonstrating the utility of a shortened, 5-item measure of Divine Command 
beliefs, we hope that the present work will facilitate ongoing research into religiosity, moral 









1. These were: moral, honest, trustworthy, fair, compassionate, and respectful (Morality 
traits), sociable, friendly, extroverted, cooperative, and enthusiastic (Sociability traits), 
competent, effective, talented, and dynamic (Competence traits), and humble, principled, 
responsible, and disciplined (Moral-competence traits).  Landy et al. (in preparation) used 
pre-ratings of the relevance of each trait for measuring the three underlying dimensions 
of morality, competence, and sociability, and the combined moral-competence factor.  
 
2. An EFA suggested a single factor structure as a first factor yielded an eigenvalue of 13.29 
and explained 69.95% of variance; a second factor explained only 5.76% of variance, 
eigenvalue = 1.10 (all other eigenvalues <.58).  This suggests than a general antipathy 
toward atheists is driving responses to each item.  We proceeded to distinguish items 
based on conceptual criteria (see Footnote 2), since a previous study by Landy et al. (in 
preparation), from which the traits were derived, found a theoretically-meaningful three-
factor structure (morality, competence, sociability) using a similar set of traits with a 
much wider cast of social targets.   
 
3. We discuss results from models that included several covariates.  We note that MFDA 
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Measure of Prohibitive and Prescriptive Moral Orientations from Study 2b 
Prohibitive rules (α = .92; M = 5.22, SD = 1.13) 
It is morally required that one not kill 
It is morally required that one not lie 
It is morally required that one not steal 
It is morally required that one avoids hurting fellow human beings 
It is morally required that one does not abuse one’s position in society 
It is morally required that one does not engage in sexual perversions 
It is morally required that one not cheat on a romantic partner 
It is morally required that one does not take advantage of others 
It is morally required that one not treat people unfairly 
It is morally required that one avoids cursing or using foul or offensive 
language 
It is morally required that one avoids threatening others with violence 
It is morally required that one does not act selfishly 
It is morally required to not break one’s promises  
It is morally required to not break one’s loyalties 
It is morally required that one avoids acting disrespectfully toward authority 
 
Prescriptive rules (α = .95; M = 5.07, SD = 1.25) 
It is morally required that one strives to save lives 
It is morally required that one tells the truth 
It is morally required that one gives to charity  
It is morally required that one volunteers one’s time for the needs of others 
It is morally required that one helps others in need whenever possible 
It is morally required that one practices sexual conduct in a respectful manner 
It is morally required that one treats a romantic partner with respect 
It is morally required that one treats others with kindness 
It is morally required that one treats others with fairness 
It is morally required that one seeks to make peace whenever possible 
It is morally required that one makes efforts to combat the injustice one sees 
It is morally required that one acts selflessly to help others 
It is morally required to keep one’s promises 
It is morally required to maintain one’s loyalties  
It is morally required that one behaves respectfully toward authority 
 
 
